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Introduction
After the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, controversies arose over whether Iraq
would be another Vietnam for the United States. The quagmire in Vietnam was
an agonizing experience for many Americans and much more so for the people
who experienced a number of bombings and attacks on the ground. What few
people remember, though, is that there was another quagmire preceding and
paralleling the one in Vietnam in the same region. In the conflict in Laos, few
Americans died, but a number of Laotians died in the battles supported by foreign
advisors and foreign arms. Even more died from the U.S. bombings of Laos in
the late 1960s and the early 1970s.
This paper tries to place the often-forgotten U.S. involvement in Laos in the
larger framework of U.S. involvement leading to Vietnam. It pays particular
attention to how the war “ended” for the United States rather than examining how
it involved itself in Laos in the first place. Most people, including myself, often
take the latter approach, but the examination of how a war ended and how people
remember it is also important. This is because they are likely to influence the
framework of people’ s thinking when they face a choice of another war or
involvement.
1
This paper also tries tentatively to compare U.S. disengagement from Laos to
U.S. disengagement from Vietnam. There has been a widespread perception
regarding Laos that the United States had successfully achieved its neutralization
in 1962 and stopped on the brink of intervention. Some people may even ask
why the United States failed in Vietnam while it succeeded in Laos. While this
kind of interpretation or question is not totally wrong, this paper argues, the U.S.
involvement itself and the path to the neutralization in Laos also represented
serious failures in U.S. policy. They are more akin to those failures in the U.S
involvement in Vietnam and the path to the “peace” agreement achieved in Paris
in 1973.
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I. Diplomacy or Military Intervention in Laos
A. Laos after 1954
On March 23, 1961, President John F. Kennedy spoke to the American people
on TV and appealed to the nation about the impending crisis in Laos. In a highly
staged performance typical of the new television age, the president talked with a
very large map of Laos at his side. This small nation must have loomed large in
the minds of Americans on that day. That image quickly faded away as events in
Cuba, Berlin and Vietnam later overshadowed the situation in Laos. The Geneva
Conference on Laos agreed on the neutralization of Laos in July 1962. It seemed
to be a good compromise that could be achieved short of U.S. military
intervention.
2
The Geneva Conference began in May 1961 and continued on and off through
the summer of 1962. Conservative, neutralist and communist forces in Laos
agreed on the cessation of hostilities, the formation of a tripartite coalition
government and the neutrality of Laos. Advisors and troops from foreign
countries were to withdraw from Laos. Fourteen nations, including the United
States and North Vietnam, participated in the conference with Great Britain and
the Soviet Union as joint chair.
3
Kennedy appointed H. Averell Harriman as
ambassador-at-large to deal with the Laotian problem. Under Harriman’ s
leadership, the Kennedy administration played a major part in the Geneva talks
and acted as a mediator among the different groups in Laos.
After the Geneva Agreement on Indochina in 1954, Laos experienced more
political crises and more turbulent armed conflicts than Vietnam. The pro-
western Royal Lao Government (RLG) conducted general elections in 1955 as
was stipulated in the Geneva Agreement. However, the Pathet Lao (PL), the
leftist group supported by North Vietnam, boycotted the elections. The elections
did not occur in the two northern provinces that the PL controlled. In 1957, the
RLG and the PL reached an agreement on a coalition government and the
supplementary elections to be held in these two provinces. A coalition
government was formed with the neutralist Prince Souvanna Phouma as prime
minister. However, the election results in May 1958 were a blow to the
Americans and the pro-western, conservative leaders in Laos. The PL and other
leftists won more than half the seats contested in the elections.
4
The election outcome and what happened later in 1958 proved to be a turning
point in Laos. The RLG and the PL had at least held talks intermittently for
political settlement until 1958. This had occurred despite the fact that the United
States provided a large amount of military aid to the RLG to strengthen its
military and internal security capabilities and often expressed strong misgivings
about the RLG’ s negotiations with the communists.
5
However, the dialogue
between the RLG and the PL became difficult after the elections. In June, young
anti-communist leaders in the Lao army and the RLG formed a group called the
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Committee for the Defense of National Interests (CDNI) with encouragement and
support from the Eisenhower administration. The CDNI and its de facto leader,
Colonel Phoumi Nosavan, came to exercise a strong influence in Laos. Souvanna
Phouma was forced to step down as prime minister. A pro-western conservative,
Phoui Sananikone, formed a new cabinet with CDNI members in August 1958.
They began to curtail the PL influence and exclude PL leaders from the
government. Military skirmishes between the Lao army and the PL force
increased. By the end of 1959, even the conservative Phoui government lost
favor with the rightists. Phoumi and the army staged a coup against Phoui in
December 1959. The U.S. government, knowing that the coup would happen,
decided to “step aside and permit Lao to work out [a] new relationship among
themselves,” as it would do in South Vietnam in 1963. Fortunately, Phoui was
not treated like Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother.
6
The dominance of Phoumi and the army in Laotian politics was short-lived.
In August 1960, a young leader of the elite paratrooper unit, Kong Le, and his
supporters in the army staged an unexpected coup against the Phoumi-backed
government. They attacked U.S. meddling in Laotian politics and advocated
neutralism. Souvanna was called in to become prime minister with the support of
Kong Le. PL members also participated in the Souvanna cabinet and the National
Assembly endorsed the Souvanna government.
In September 1960, a counteroffensive by Phoumi’s force began against the
neutralist government. Phoumi proclaimed the formation of a new government
with Prince Boun Oum as prime minister. An all-out civil war started between
the rightists on one hand and the neutralist Kong Le group and the PL on the
other. By December 1960, the Phoumi force took over Vientiane, but battles
continued. Eisenhower did not recognize the Souvanna government and
continued to provide military aid to the Lao army, i.e., the Phoumi force. Not
only the major communist states but also the U.S. allies, Great Britain and France,
supported the Souvanna government against the Phoumi-Boun Oum group.
Since 1954, the Soviet Union had refrained from direct involvement in Laos.
However, in December 1960, it started airlifting arms and equipment to the PL
and the neutralist forces. The Soviet airlift was apparently a response to
Phoumi’s offensive and the U.S. support. But American officials became quite
alarmed by the “evidence” of Soviet intervention. The small elephant kingdom
suddenly came onto the center stage of the worldwide “cold war” struggle.
B. Diplomacy and Planning for Military Intervention
In a meeting in January 1961, Eisenhower warned Kennedy about this grave
situation in Laos and even hinted at the need for U.S. military intervention in
Laos. As soon as he became president, Kennedy organized a special Task Force
on Laos to re-examine U.S. policy. Kennedy’s TV appearance in March was the
culmination of a two-month-long re-examination of U.S. policy by the new
administration.
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Some studies on the Vietnam War simply state that Kennedy proposed
neutralization for Laos in his March speech and achieved it in 1962. However,
this is only half true. While Kennedy said that the United States would support
“a neutral and independent Laos” and earnestly work for a negotiated settlement
in Laos, he also mentioned SEATO’s “special treaty responsibilities toward an
aggression against Laos” and said, “No one should doubt our own resolution on
this point.”
7
Within the administration, Kennedy and his advisors discussed possible
military measures as much as they did a negotiated settlement in Laos. What they
had in mind was a two-track policy―while seeking a negotiated settlement, they
prepared for military intervention in Laos in case political negotiations failed.
Two weeks before Kennedy’s Laos speech, the administration had decided on
increased military measures for Laos to strengthen the Phoumi force. Kennedy
stepped up the provision of military supplies to Phoumi, increased the number of
U.S. military advisors and strengthened the Hmong force.
8
The Hmong tribesmen
had been receiving covert U.S. military aid and fighting against the PL force.
The administration also went into a discussion with the British government for
a joint SEATO military intervention in Laos. Soon after the Laos speech,
Kennedy met British premier Harold Macmillan at Key West, Florida. Both
agreed to give priority to political negotiations, but Kennedy secured Macmillan’s
commitment to a possible joint military intervention in Laos in case of a
breakdown of political talks.
9
Military leaders from both countries worked on
elaborating a military contingency plan for Laos and agreed on what was called
SEATO Plan 5 by May. It envisaged committing U.S. and U.K. forces into the
panhandle or the southern part of Laos.
10
The British commitment to joint military intervention is noteworthy. The
British supported Souvanna and had serious doubts about a military solution for
Laos. Nonetheless, they decided to support the U.S. military action in Laos if it
should occur. After the Key West meeting, the British Foreign Minister recorded:
“If America after weighing everything decides to go in, I fear we must support
them but the prospect is horrible.” The Minister of Defence shared the same
sentiment: “Military intervention in Laos has always been a nonsense, but if
Americans are determined on a limited intervention, we can play our part.”
11
The
British liked the new president and accepted the idea of joint military intervention
if it would be limited in nature and British participation would have a restraining
influence over U.S. policy.
12
Fortunately, new situations in Laos and other areas of the world narrowly
saved the U.S. and the British leaders from making the egregious choice of
sending their troops inside Laos. On May 2, the Defense Department
recommended to Kennedy that the United States intervene in Laos if there should
be no satisfactory cease-fire.
13
While U.S. officials were holding discussions in
Washington, the opponents in Laos just reached a temporary cease-fire effective
May 3. Kennedy’s failure at the Bay of Pigs in April probably contributed to the
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loss of appetite for military measures. Kennedy also had to give a higher priority
to Berlin and U.S.-Soviet relations.
14
C. Geneva and Re-examination of U.S. Policy
Talks at the Geneva Conference on Laos reached a deadlock as soon as they
started in mid-May. The Phoumi group refused to send its representatives to
Geneva. There were disagreements on how various Lao groups should be
represented in the conference and on the actual implementation of a cease-fire.
In fact, many of the negotiations leading to the Geneva Accord in 1962
occurred outside Geneva. In early June, Kennedy had a meeting with the Soviet
premier, Nikita Khrushchev. They agreed on the establishment of “an
independent and neutral Laos.” Khrushchev said that they “should use their
influence so as to bring about agreement among the forces participating in the
Laotian struggle.” In late June, the three Lao princes―Souvanna, the PL leader
Souphanouvong and Boun Oum―met in Zurich and agreed on the formation of a
provisional government. The appointment of a prime minister and the
composition of the government were left to further negotiations.
15
U.S. policy toward Laos began to shift gradually around this period. In the
NSC meeting of June 29, Harriman expressed his belief that Souvanna would
probably become the next prime minister. Kennedy agreed.
16
On the same day,
Phoumi visited Washington and met Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara. He had a meeting with the president the next day. Phoumi told Rusk
that the Geneva Conference was convened “against the wishes of the Royal
Laotian Government.” He told Kennedy that “a government of national union
was only one more possibility for Communist penetration of Laos” and that
“Souvanna is not the true leader of neutralism.” It was clear that Phoumi was not
willing to endorse the agreement at Zurich nor a government presided over by
Souvanna. Kennedy emphasized U.S. support for “an independent and neutral
Laos” and told Phoumi that “we do not want to resolve the situation by purely
military means.”
17
Phoumi’s visit to Washington revealed a wide gap between his position and
the position of the Kennedy administration on the resolution of the crisis in Laos.
A report from Winthrop Brown, U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane, on Phoumi’s
statement after his return sent a further alarm to Washington. According to
Brown, Phoumi returned from Washington “vastly encouraged” and believed that
the United States was “now prepared to back him militarily.” Phoumi had his
own military plans and Brown worried that Phoumi “may decide to force our
hands....”
18
By the end of July, the Kennedy administration concluded that the Souvanna
government would be the only option available in Laos. Realism prevailed over
ideological antipathy toward neutralism. At a White House meeting on July 28,
while discussing plans for military intervention, Kennedy worried that Phoumi’s
“real wish may be to have the conference break up and then get us into military
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action in Laos.” He also expressed his feeling that “we should have to take a
Souvanna government, sooner or later.” Despite his advisors’ recommendation,
Kennedy made no decision on military intervention and “made it very plain that
he himself is at present very reluctant to make a decision to go into Laos.”
19
However, Kennedy always kept his options open, or, to put it more critically, was
indecisive. Military contingency planning continued through 1962. Kennedy
encouraged it and never committed himself to any meaningful reduction of U.S.
aid to the Phoumi and the Hmong forces.
The U.S. acceptance of Souvanna brought about an agreement with Britain
and France on August 7. At the foreign ministers’ meeting in Paris to discuss the
Berlin question, the three countries also discussed Laos. They agreed to support
Souvanna as the prime minister of a provisional government and seek an
understanding with Souvanna on such issues as the composition of the
government and the integration of the military forces.
20
At a meeting at the end of August, the White House adopted a new direction
for U.S. policy. Kennedy and his advisors decided to get Harriman to have
“direct conversations” with Souvanna and intensify the diplomatic effort. At the
same time, they still pursued the other part of their two-track policy. The meeting
also proposed to seek conversations with SEATO allies to further develop PLAN
5, increase U.S. and Thai military advisors in Laos and increase the number of the
Hmong forces by 2,000 to the total strength of 11,000.
21
Therefore, the acceptance of the Souvanna solution did not totally dispel the
ambiguities and divisions over the Laotian question. Some officials even
believed that a divided Laos was better than a unified Laos with communist
influence. The policy of giving priority to diplomacy also invited some protest
from U.S. ambassadors in Vientiane, Saigon and Bangkok. They felt that, rather
than rushing toward the establishment of a Souvanna government, the United
States might “bide [its] time” and see how things would develop while
completing a military intervention plan in case of resumption of hostilities.
22
Despite some grumbling from the ambassadors on the spot, Kennedy’s special
representative, Harriman, was most energetic and willing to go forward with the
Souvanna solution. From Geneva, he reported in mid-September that the Soviet
representative repeatedly assured him that North Vietnam would be “ready to live
up to [the] agreement” if it was reached. The Pathet Lao would be ready, too.
Harriman felt there was a “real change” in Soviet policy. He then visited
Vientiane and held talks with Souvanna. Harriman felt that, although Souvanna’s
position on the selection of cabinet members was not acceptable yet, Souvanna
took “a realistic position on several subjects.” He thought that Souvanna
considered the Pathet Lao his opponents. Souvanna also “unqualifiedly accepted
[the] responsibility to close Laos as [a] corridor for [the] Viet Cong.”
23
Harriman also had talks with Phoumi. Phoumi expressed his reservation
about Souvanna as prime minister. Harriman flatly told Phoumi that there were
“really only two alternatives in Laos―a peaceful negotiated solution or
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resumption of hostilities.” He also told Phoumi that Kennedy had asked him to
make it clear that the United States “was not prepared to support RLG in any
military initiative on its part to move north to recapture [the] lost areas....” He
came out of the meeting with a “strong impression that he [Phoumi] has no real
intention of pursuing serious negotiations.” Harriman also told Washington:
“The more I see of Phoumi, the less I trust him as [the] US chosen instrument to
carry out faithfully our agreed policies and objectives now or later.”
24
In early October, the three princes met again in Laos and finally agreed on
Souvanna as the prime minister of a coalition government. A new cabinet was to
include 16 ministers and its dominant members should be from a “truly neutral”
group. From Geneva, Harriman reported on his talks with the Soviets. He said
that “we may be on [the] verge of [a] significant break-through..., depending, of
course, on [the] outcome of negotiations [among the] three Princes in Laos.”
25
Kennedy gave wide discretion to Harriman in his negotiations on Laos.
However, some officials in Washington did not share Harriman’ s view. In
response to Harriman’s recommendation for more pressure on Phoumi, the State
Department advised restraint and told him that Phoumi still followed the “general
line” of policy that the U.S. desired. On November 1, Harriman’s recall for
consultation in Washington was proposed in the State Department. One official
wrote in his proposal that the United States had made so many concessions and
felt that they should coordinate the overall policy with Harriman.
26
Harriman
became very emotional about this issue. Kennedy had to intervene and had two
telephone conversations with Harriman on November 1 and 2. Harriman won the
president over to his side. Harriman sent an “eyes only” telegram to Kennedy
and Rusk, stating: “It is fantastic that General Phoumi, who is entirely [a] US
creation, should be permitted to continue to dictate American policy. Time is
running out fast.” Rusk and other officials went along with Harriman.
27
By the end of November, Harriman’s dominance of the Laotian issue in
Washington became quite clear. In what was called the “Thanksgiving
massacre,” Kennedy named Harriman as Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs. Harriman replaced the official who remained in the department
from the previous administration and had differences with him. Kennedy
appointed as Under Secretary of State George Ball, a dove, who shared
Harriman’s view on Laos.
28
With his stature and reputation, Harriman even came
to overshadow Rusk on the Laotian question.
II. The “Neutralization” of Laos
A. The Limits of U.S. Influence
After Harriman’ s return to Washington, the U.S. attitude toward Phoumi
became noticeably tougher. A State Department telegram to Brown in early
December stated that Brown would be “authorized to inform Phoumi that we
[would be] no longer able [to] work with him” if he refused to negotiate further
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with Souvanna. In another telegram, Harriman stated that, if full-scale hostilities
should break out in Laos, the United States would be required to put its force into
Laos or Laos would be overrun. He emphasized to Brown that “[o]ur policy then
must be to avoid facing the President with either of these extreme alternatives.”
For this purpose, Harriman said that the United States must be prepared to
consider “drastic steps such as bringing about Phoumi’ s departure” from the
government.
29
Yet, no “drastic” measures were carried out.
In Geneva, the major powers came to an agreement on the principal points for
the neutralization of Laos by the end of December. Yet, negotiations on the
composition of the new cabinet dragged on mostly due to Phoumi’s intransigence.
Phoumi complained to his CIA liaison officer that he was “too deeply shocked by
[the] defeatist policy” of the United States and that it was treating the RLG “like a
small child.” On January 3, 1962, Brown recommended the suspension of
military aid for the Phoumi force. He informed Washington that he had “no
pressures left to use on Phoumi and Boun Oum” and “had made all the threats
that words alone can convey.”
30
He could not win Washington’s approval of the
suspension of military aid. There were still disagreements in the administration
on how much tougher Washington should be on Phoumi. At the meeting on
January 6, Kennedy reaffirmed his support of the Souvanna government despite
some protests from his advisors and authorized “a high-level ‘dicker’ with
Phoumi.” On the day before the meeting, the “Special Group (Counter-
Insurgency)” recommended that the United States “offer him substantial funds in
retirement” if Phoumi showed “any signs of being willing to resign his present
position” while “consideration of a coup d’etat against General Phoumi be
discarded for the time being....”
31
Phoumi did not resign from his position.
Despite Harriman’s ascendancy over U.S. policy toward Laos, there was an
important limitation to the American influence over Phoumi. Kennedy never
suspended the military aid to the Phoumi force although he showed token pressure
by temporarily suspending cash grants to the RLG in January. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) was totally against the suspension of the military aid. The JSC
memo on January 5 said: “The military position of the RLG is not such that we
must seek a peaceful settlement at all cost” and “To cut off US aid to anti-
communists elements at this juncture would be self-defeating.”
32
At the end of
January, the Kennedy administration pressured Phoumi to give up the posts of
Defense and Interior ministers to the neutralists, but he did not listen. Despite the
stepped-up carrot-and-stick approach, U.S. policy toward Laos arrived at a
deadlock again.
B. The Fall of Nam Tha and Its Meaning
On February 1, 1962, a report of a military clash between Phoumi and PL
forces in Nam Tha in northern Laos came in. U.S. sources determined that the
Phoumi force started the attacks. This incident prompted Washington to
reappraise its policy toward Laos. At a meeting of State, Defense and CIA
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representatives, Harriman proposed that the United States, Great Britain and
France negotiate directly with Souvanna on the composition of a new cabinet and
switch U.S. recognition to Souvanna’ s government when they reached an
agreement. This meant bypassing Phoumi. The officials from the Defense
Department and the CIA agreed to Harriman’s proposal.
33
The ambassadors of
the three countries held talks with Souvanna in Vientiane and temporarily agreed
on a list of new cabinet ministers. However, Phoumi refused to accept the fait
accompli. A subsequent approach to Phoumi in early March by the U.S.
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), as well as State Department and CIA
officials, did not bear fruit even though their message was quite clear―Phoumi
would lose U.S. military aid unless he gave up the Defense and Interior posts and
agreed to the proposed list. In Washington, Kennedy met with Congressional
leaders to discuss Laos in late February. The leaders were quite unwilling to
endorse U.S. military intervention in Laos.
34
Finally, Harriman himself went to Laos to persuade Phoumi in March.
Harriman first visited Bangkok and convinced the Thai premier Marshall Sarit, a
strong supporter of Phoumi, to come with him to persuade Phoumi. They met in
Nong Khai on the bank of the Mekong River across from Thailand. William H.
Sullivan, Harriman’s right-hand man, remembered that Harriman was very harsh
with Phoumi at the meeting. Michael Forrestal, Harriman’s French interpreter,
remembered him telling Phoumi that, if the fighting continued, “You bastards will
have to swim that river out there, and not all of you are going to make it.”
35
Harriman was not yet authorized to tell Phoumi that the United States would
suspend its military aid in the event that he would not listen. Kennedy was still
indecisive and hesitant to execute military sanctions against Phoumi. He was
afraid of weakening the anti-communist base in Laos.
Still, after the Nong Khai meeting, there occurred a gradual shift both in U.S.
policy and Phoumi’s attitude. The Kennedy administration finally began to give
serious consideration to “mild” military sanctions against Phoumi and Phoumi
showed signs of being more accommodating to U.S. persuasion.
36
However, the most decisive moment came before these changes were put into
action. It came on May 6 when the PL force started an all-out attack on the
Phoumi force at Nam Tha. Most Phoumi soldiers gave up fighting and many of
them literally had to “swim” over the Mekong to escape to Thailand. Harriman’s
words turned out to be true. As soon as the communist attack started in Nam Tha,
The New York Times characterized it as a possible Dien Bien Phu.
37
The battle
was far from comparable to Dien Bien Phu. But in a sense it was a Dien Bien
Phu for Phoumi and the United States because the decisive defeat of the Phoumi
force finally changed the whole situation. There was no longer any need for U.S.
military sanctions against Phoumi.
It has generally been believed that the strong pressure from the United States
brought about a change in Phoumi’s stubborn attitude against the neutralization of
Laos. When we reexamine the process leading to the fall of Nam Tha, we know
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that the Kennedy administration meandered even after its confidence in the
Phoumi group came to be seriously questioned in early 1961. Lacking any
substantial military sanctions, U.S. pressure had little influence over Phoumi’s
attitude. What really had an impact was the fall of Nam Tha. Although the
Kennedy administration sent the 7th Fleet to the Gulf of Siam after the fall of
Nam Tha and discussed possible military intervention plans for Laos, the
enthusiasm for intervention lost much of its fervor by this time.
The neutralization of Laos did not mean that the United States gave up Laos to
the communists. Its importance lay in providing a framework for the withdrawal
of foreign troops and military personnel from Laos. This meant that the North
Vietnamese military as well as the U.S. military had to withdraw its personnel
from Laos. The United States continued its covert aid to the Hmong forces after
1962 while the communist side used the corridor in Laos for transporting arms
and supplies to their comrades in South Vietnam.
Despite this kind of deception on both sides and the resumption of fighting in
Laos and the eventual U.S. bombing of the Laotian corridor, the neutralization
was significant for the United States because it provided an important framework
for the “Laotization” of the conflict. It enabled the United States to seal off the
choice of committing its own ground troops in Laos.
38
The neutralization was also significant for the defense of South Vietnam.
Laos had long been considered a buffer against the communist “encroachment.”
As U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand, wrote in early 1961, the
importance of Laos “lay not so much in itself as in [its] effects on Thailand and
South Vietnam.” According to Forrestal’s memo to the president before the fall
of Nam Tha, Harriman felt that “the more flexible policy in Laos is best
understood in terms of our stronger strategic position in Vietnam.”
39
Kennedy
had greatly increased the number of U.S. military advisors in South Vietnam by
the end of 1961. After Nam Tha, he immediately deployed U.S. troops in
Thailand to prevent further deterioration of the situation. For the United States,
the neutralization of Laos was an important part of the policy of making a stand or
drawing the line in Vietnam.
40
III. “Extrication” from Vietnam
A. Fighting and Ending the War under the Illusion of “Peace with Honor”
In March 1965, less than three years after sealing off the choice of committing
U.S. ground troops to Laos, the United States chose to send them to South
Vietnam.
41
This came soon after it initiated bombing attacks against North
Vietnam. The United States widened the scope of air attacks against North
Vietnam and also within South Vietnam. By the end of 1967, the number of U.S.
troops in South Vietnam rose to more than 450,000. Although there were some
peace initiatives during this period, it was not until the Tet offensive started at the
end of January, 1968, that many people in the United States realized that there
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was something wrong with this war.
In retrospect, one may wonder why U.S. officials thought that the United
States could win the struggle for nation building in Vietnam while it failed in a
similar endeavor in a much smaller country next door. An illusion of power that
most Americans naturally had in their own country’s superb air- and fire-power
might explain part of this puzzle. Moreover, most Americans except for those
who witnessed events first-hand did not realize how strenuous the determination
of the indigenous people could be to defend their own country from “foreign
aggression” and to choose their own form of government.
It is well known that the Tet offensive was not a total military defeat for the
U.S. military force in South Vietnam. But the shock it gave to the officials of the
Lyndon B. Johnson administration, the mass media and the public in the United
States probably made it an easy candidate for another Dien Bien Phu in many
people’s minds. It gradually became clear that a military victory was not within
reach without further military commitment and sacrifices by the United States.
Even with such an escalation, there was no guarantee that the United States could
win or that the American public could tolerate further casualties and atrocities
until the war ended.
As in the case of Laos, the change of administration helped in promoting a
new direction in Vietnam. This does not mean that Richard M. Nixon was much
different from his predecessors in his attitude toward the problem in Vietnam.
But the year 1968 was different. The Tet offensive epitomized a series of failures
in the U.S. effort in Vietnam. With the number of American casualties constantly
rising and with no light at the end of the tunnel, the public mood had changed a
great deal from the 1950s and the early 1960s. The former vice president also
benefited from his hawkish record and his absence from Washington during the
previous Democratic administrations. He could criticize the Democrats’ policy
although the U.S. commitment in Vietnam was rooted in the Eisenhower-Nixon
period.
During the presidential campaign in 1968, Nixon was vague about what kind
of policy he would pursue as president. He told the American people that he
would seek “peace” and bring “an honorable end to the war in Vietnam.”
42
Nixon
later used the famous phrase “peace with honor.” However, the huge costs that
the Nixon administration inflicted on the Vietnamese, the Cambodians, the
Laotians and the Americans even while pursuing a negotiated settlement did
much damage to both “peace” and “honor.”
43
How the Nixon administration developed its war and exit strategy has been
much examined. There is still much debate on what the real intentions of Nixon
and Henry Kissinger, his national security advisor, were in the negotiations
leading to Paris, but one thing might at least be said: As shrewd politicians and
realists, Nixon and Kissinger were fully aware of the limits of human sacrifice
that the American people could tolerate. Their foremost objective was to get the
U.S. troops out of Vietnam. Even though they may not have intended to throw
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away the anti-communist government in South Vietnam in the gutter, they felt
that the Vietnamization of the conflict was inevitable for the United States. This
was a shock to the government of South Vietnam, which had been living with the
Americanized war for several years. Nixon and Kissinger, however, did not pay
much attention to this. They pursued a framework that should make the
withdrawal of U.S. troops possible. And that settlement should come not as a
result of weakness. As Kissinger wrote in his memorandum to Nixon in 1971,
“For the future of our own people as well as [for] international reasons, it is
essential that we leave Vietnam as an act of government policy and with dignity,
not as a response to pressures and in the form of a collapse.”
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Probably without
much realizing it, they followed the path that Kennedy and Harriman had
followed in Laos.
B. Laos and Vietnam
In 2003, Kissinger published his memoirs on the Vietnam negotiations
entitled Ending the Vietnam War. The subtitle of the book is A History of
America’s Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War. Although the
magnitude of U.S. military involvement was incomparable, we see many
similarities between America’s quagmire in and disengagement from Laos on one
hand and America’s quagmire in and “extrication” from Vietnam on the other.
In both countries, the United States sent its military advisors at the earliest
stage of its commitment and poured in a great amount of military aid for several
years in order to strengthen the military, para-military and internal security
capabilities of the indigenous government against the communist influence.
Despite the initial prospect for success, the control of the government in both
countries was liquidated by competing nationalist forces, and internal military
clashes increased. We might see the root of such chaos in an inevitable internal
struggle among different nationalist forces that could have happened in any
country after decolonization. In view of the U.S. effort to prop up one nationalist
group or “client” government against another, the United States clearly failed in
its effort both in Laos and Vietnam. The United States was unable to reform and
strengthen the local government that it supported. Even though the local
government and the groups that received U.S. support were not effective, the
United States continued and increased its military support to them in the face of
mounting military pressures by the enemy.
In both cases, when the crisis reached its peak, new leaders appeared in the
United States. Kennedy and Nixon had to learn from the failures of the previous
administrations. They realized that there was not much sense, either military or
political, in the presence of the U.S. troops in a country once the war became
difficult to win. They both groped for the key to the withdrawal of the U.S.
military personnel. The process was not easy. Kennedy was often indecisive in
deed although not necessarily in words. He came close to executing an
intervention plan in Laos. But he was lucky. Nixon and Kissinger were more
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determined. But, one might say, they were more savage and did not mind
expanding the war and bombarding the enemy while negotiating with them.
In both Laos and Vietnam, the U.S. government gave up on ineffective
civilian leaders and acquiesced in or even encouraged the military’s rise to power.
This greatly increased the military tension in both countries. However, the more
militarized the conflict became, the more difficult it became to support the
military effort of the group that the United States supported. It also became clear
how futile it was to keep fighting someone else’s war in a remote country.
Eventually, in Laos, Phoumi and his force suffered a clear-cut defeat at Nam
Tha. In Vietnam, the U.S. military and the army of South Vietnam were unable
to turn the tide and eventually suffered a largely psychological, but decisive,
“defeat” in the Tet offensive.
After Nam Tha and Tet, the road to Laotization and Vietnamization was
prepared. In Laos, it took the form of neutralization with the United States giving
up the objective of establishing an anti-communist government there. In
Vietnam, it eventually took the form of what they called a “peace agreement”
with very little guarantee that any “peace” would prevail or the U.S.-supported
government could survive. In either case, the U.S. officials could not afford to
listen to the demands of their old allies. Nor did the U.S. officials try to keep
them much informed about the details of negotiations leading to the final
settlement with the communist side.
In both Laos and Vietnam, what was most important was to secure the
disengagement of the U.S. military personnel from the soil of these countries.
The self-centered motive for the U.S. disengagement, however, did not guarantee
a peace nor an end of the conflict for those people whom the United States
professed to be saving from communist rule. Geneva and Paris only meant an
end of a quagmire for the United States.
Conclusion
This paper has aimed to provide a more detailed analysis of the American side
of the story leading to the Geneva Accord on Laos than had been remembered in
the past. It has also tried to correct some misperceptions about the neutralization
process of Laos. The analysis shows how futile the U.S. policy was in propping
up the U.S.-supported government and how ineffective the U.S. pressure was in
the process leading to neutralization. But the American experience in Laos was
soon forgotten in the midst of the mounting crisis in Vietnam. U.S. policymakers,
even those who were in a position to witness the failure in Laos, did not
remember it or chose to believe that Vietnam was quite different from Laos and,
consciously or unconsciously, followed the same path in Vietnam.
Not only contemporary policymakers but also historians and the public forgot
the American experience in Laos. Many studies on the Vietnam War do not give
much attention to what happened in Laos as well as other countries of Southeast
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Asia in the 1950s and the 1960s. Except for some new studies, they scarcely
mention Laos.
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Is this because of historians’ negligence or because of the neglect
of historical memories on the part of policymakers on which historians inevitably
have to depend? In either case, the public has almost no way of remembering
what happened and what the United States did in such faraway countries in
Southeast Asia.
The loss of collective memories can have a serious impact on what the
following generations will experience. A couple of comments are in order
concerning the memories of Laos and Vietnam. First, the lack of the sense of
failure on the part of the United States under the guise of “neutralization” and
“peace agreement” eventually would likely have weakened the lessons that some
people thought that they had learned. Particularly, people might easily have
forgotten the fact that the United States involved itself in nation building in other
countries and did not have the power to change the situation, thus letting people in
a later period be carried away with another case of a “we-can-do-it” mentality.
Second, what seems more horrible is that, with a facade of neutralization or peace,
many people scarcely realize the disproportionate human costs that the United
States inflicted directly or indirectly on the other side. People may remember
Vietnam as an “American tragedy,” but the sense of moral responsibility for
others escapes many people’s minds. They do not seriously come to question the
validity of the use of America’s formidable military force against others even if
others were just fighting with stones and sticks.
This kind of tendency may not be particular to the United States. Any great
power can cause great casualties in the process of involving itself and failing in an
internal conflict in other countries. And when a great power disengages itself
from such failure, it does so mostly for its own sake and not for a real settlement
of the problem. Every war must end for ourselves, but not necessarily for others.
As an epilogue, something may be said about religion and foreign policy or
international politics. A certain religious belief or self-righteousness, often mixed
with racial or ethnic prejudice, may constitute an important part in the thinking of
some policymakers. These factors may influence a country’s foreign policy on
certain issues at a certain period of history. But we have to be careful when we
examine such factors influencing a certain policy. Not all leaders uniformly share
the same thinking even if they share the same religious belief. The American
people had Eisenhower as well as John Foster Dulles, George F. Kennan as well
as Reinhold Niebuhr. People with the same religious belief can easily make
different recommendations for foreign policy. Some people may have
“missionary zeal,” lean toward intervention or become “crusaders” while others
may become isolationist or strongly protest against intervention and the atrocities
that come with it because of their strong religious belief. In the case of Laos, one
can see much self-righteousness and prejudice in statements made by U.S.
policymakers, but most of these statements are not necessarily related to religion.
Whether or not some religious belief contributes to the formulation of an
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interventionist policy, the intervention may not succeed. Laos, Vietnam and most
other cases of post-World-War-II U.S. intervention show that an intervention can
easily fail once one is in a remote country where there is always a great limit to
whatever political control or influence any foreign power can exercise. In
Vietnam, some Americans welcomed the fact that Ngo Dinh Diem was a
Christian and found him worthy of U.S. support. However, when the Kennedy
administration abandoned him, Diem’s Christianity was no longer important for
most people. This does not mean that Diem’ s Christianity or the internal
religious conflict was unimportant in the struggle among Vietnamese nationalists.
It only means that Diem’s religion probably lost its importance for U.S. policy in
the subsequent development of events in Vietnam.
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In any case, the U.S. effort
to end a quagmire in Laos and Vietnam might show that, in international politics,
self-interest easily overtakes self-righteousness or religious or moral consistency.
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